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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incen-
tives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection a¤ects both the expropriation of
shareholders and the blockholders incentives to monitor. Because of this latter e¤ect and its
repercussion on managerial incentives, outside ownership concentration and legal shareholder
protection can be both substitutes or complements. This holds irrespective of whether or not
the large shareholder can reap private benets. Moreover, better legal protection may exacer-
bate rather than alleviate the conict of interest between large and small shareholders. In the
extended framework with monetary incentives, ownership is fully dispersed when legal share-
holder protection is strong. Otherwise, outside block ownership is optimal and is a substitute
to legal protection when the law is of intermediate quality, while it is a complement when the
law is poor.
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1 Introduction
The literature on corporate governance has traditionally concentrated on the conict of inter-
ests between self-interested managers and dispersed small shareholders. Within this paradigm,
the lack of monitoring due to free-rider problems is the fundamental problem that a good gover-
nance structure must overcome. In contrast to this image of the modern corporation, empirical
research demonstrates that rms are generally not widely held (Barca and Becht (1999) La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999)). Outside the United States and the United King-
dom, most rms, even the largest corporations, tend to have a dominant shareholder, while
large share stakes and dominant shareholders are a common phenomenon even in the United
States (Holderness and Sheehan ((1988), Zwiebel (1995)).
The presence of a large shareholder changes the nature of the governance problem. Unlike
small shareholders, large blockholders have an incentive to monitor managers, thereby mitigat-
ing the agency problem between managers and shareholders. In addition, large shareholders can
use their inuence to pursue their own goals, possibly at the expense of the small shareholders.
Hence, the view that ownership concentration necessarily protects minority shareholders is too
simplistic. While large shareholders alleviate the traditional corporate agency problem, they
are also the source of another agency problem.
The role of ownership concentration as a governance mechanism exemplies how di¤erences
in institutions have implications for the nature of the governance problem. Currently, the
relevance of law for corporate governance attracts much attention. Following the pioneering
work by La Porta et al. (1997), a growing literature argues that cross-country di¤erences in
corporate governance, and more broadly in nancial systems, are shaped by the quality of
legal rules protecting outside investors. One prominent nding of this new Law and Finance
literature, which is summarized by La Porta et al. (2000b), is the inverse relationship between
ownership concentration and quality of legal shareholder protection. 1 The common argument
is that investors are willing to take minority positions and nance companies in countries
where legal rules are extensive and well enforced. By contrast, where the legal framework
fails to provide su¢cient protection, investors compensate for this deciency by taking large
positions in rms.
This paper scrutinizes the validity of this common argument for the case of outside owner-
ship concentration. To this end, we analyze the interaction between legal shareholder protec-
tion, managerial incentives, and ownership in a setting where the large shareholder can both
protect and act against the interests of the small shareholders. Our central proposition is that
1
Empirical studies proxy legal shareholder protection by an index which aggregates shareholder rights and
legal provisions that favor minority shareholders in the corporate decision making process, such as e.g., the
one-share one-vote rule, the preemptive right to buy new issues of shares, the possibility to mail the proxy vote,
the right to challenge the directors decision in court, and mandatory dividend requirements.
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outside ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection can be both substitutes or
complements. The alleged, strictly inverse relationship holds within our framework when the
law is of intermediate quality or when legal shareholder protection has, by assumption, no
direct impact on security benets and all shareholders have perfectly congruent interests.
Our starting point is the observation that several parties in a rm, such as managers and
active large investors, contribute to the creation of shareholder value. The distribution of
corporate surplus a¤ects the parties incentives to make rm-specic investments and thus
determines the size of the surplus (Grossman and Hart (1986)). When contracts are incomplete,
empowering one party may discourage investments by others. Consequently, the allocation of
power among the di¤erent constituencies in a rm is an important determinant of shareholder
value.2
As the Law and Finance literature emphasizes, legal shareholder protection a¤ects the ease
with which the manager, possibly in collusion with the large shareholders, can divert corporate
resources. We argue that there is another e¤ect which this literature has overlooked: the
quality of legal rules also shapes the large shareholders incentives to monitor. That is, the law
a¤ects the mapping from ownership concentration to monitoring. This is of importance for the
relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration, because shareholder control
through monitoring weakens the managers incentives to undertake valuable investments. Due
to this e¤ect, ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection can be both substitutes
or complements. For the same reason, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than
alleviate the conict of interest between large and small shareholders.
More specically, we consider a rm with a large shareholder and otherwise dispersed own-
ership. The rm has the prospect of a valuable project which realizes with some probability
only if the manager exerts e¤ort. Given that the project is undertaken, the resulting proceeds
can either be paid out to all shareholders on a pro-rata basis or transformed into private ben-
ets at a dead-weight loss. This decision is taken by the manager, if the large shareholder
remains uninformed. By contrast, when monitoring is successful, the large shareholder decides
whether to pay out the proceeds or whether to divert resources and share the private benets
with the manager. Within this framework, ownership concentration has benets as well as costs
(Burkart et al. (1997)). When the large shareholder monitors more due to a larger stake, he
is more likely to control the resource allocation. This in turn reduces the managers incentive
to exert e¤ort because he is less likely to extract (large) private benets. Since managerial
initiative is valuable, maximizing net shareholder return may require to constrain monitoring
2Tirole (2001) distinguishes between two main approaches to corporate governance; the shareholder value
perspective and the stakeholder society perspective. We do not argue here in favor of either perspective. Instead,
we simply point out that several parties contribute to the creation of share value, even when one subscribes to
the shareholder value perspective.
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